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Attorney(s) for the COUNTY OF MARIN



KIM TURNER, Court Executive Officer MARIN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT By: J. Chen, Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF MARIN

Community Ventures Partners, Inc.,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,

1 000001101/1

V

County of Marin,

Respondent/Defendant

Case No.: CV 1404718

DECLARATION OF DAVID ZALTSMAN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE AT DEPOSITIONS

DATE:

July 22, 2015

TIME:

8:30 a.m.

DEPT:

В

Honorable Roy O. Chernus

David Zaltsman declares as follows:

- I am a Deputy County Counsel for the County of Marin, and the attorney of record for the Respondent herein.
- 2. The Petition for Writ of Mandate herein was filed on December 16, 2014 and received by our office on December 19, 2014. I received the case for handling on January 5, 2015.
- 3. The Petition attached ten (10) exhibits.
- 4. I first contacted counsel for the Petitioner on January 15, 2015 by e-mail. In that e-mail, among other things, I asked if there was going to be an "administrative record" in this case or

Declaration of David Zaltsman
In Opposition to Motion to Compel
MCSC Case No. CV 1404718

whether the attachments to the petition were intended to be the full record. (See Exhibit "A" hereto.)

- 5. Counsel for Petitioner's response was as follows: "Since this is traditional mandamus and not an administrative mandamus case, there won't be an administrative record. But I will have some additional exhibits to attach to future motions or briefs. And you are right it is a noticed motion course." (See Exhibit "A".)
- 6. The County filed its Answer to the Petition on January 30, 2015.
- 7. On Friday February 13, 2015, counsel for petitioner wrote me by e-mail to ask if the County would "...stipulate to an order shortening time for the CMC and for an accelerated hearing schedule." (See Exhibit "B" hereto.)
- 8. On Tuesday February 17, 2015 I replied that the County was already in the process of filing what we believed was an appropriate dispositive motion and that a hearing date would be set. (See Exhibit "B" hereto.)
- 9. In our opening brief on our motion we stated that we were not disputing any "material fact" contained in the petition, therefore the petition could be "determined" by the Court upon the noticed motion of any party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.
- 10. In their opposition, although petitioner claimed the County was using the CCP 1094 process to attempt to preempt the petitioner from conducting discovery, petitioners actual argument agreed with the County that the CCP section 1094 process "...precludes the County from challenging any facts alleged by Petitioner." At no point in their opposition brief—or otherwise prior to the hearing- did petitioner request a continuance of the hearing to conduct discovery. This was despite the fact that the two (2) declarations that now seem to be the

- focus of petitioner's concerns were filed with our opening brief. In addition, petitioner submitted five (5) additional exhibits with their opposition brief.
- 11. Despite this, this Court refused to address the merits of the motion, treating the motion as one for "judgment on the pleadings" as opposed to "judgment on the peremptory writ" pursuant to the plain language of CCP section 1094.
- 12. The County pointed out this discrepancy at the oral argument on the Court's tentative ruling, but the Court elected to stay with the tentative ruling. And at the oral argument, Petitioner claimed they did object to the CCP 1094 process. They now claimed that they wanted to conduct discovery based upon the declarations submitted with the County's motion from two (2) members of the Board of Supervisors. (So that the true record is clear, the County has obtained and attaches hereto a true and correct copy of the transcript of the hearing held on March 25, 2015 hereto as Exhibit "C.")
- 13. At the hearing, the Court stated that it understood that its ruling might "open the door" to inappropriate and unnecessary discovery since the "...facts are fairly clear...." The Court therefore stated that "...I will expect that there will be some motion on whether there is a need for discovery or not a need for discovery...." (Exhibit "C" at page 7.)
- 14. However, rather than discuss whether there was a legitimate need for discovery in this matter, petitioner simply served the County with a "Request for Production of Documents and Things, Set One." Since the requested documents –to the extent there were any-would constitute public records, the County elected not to bring any motion opposing this discovery at that time. The hope, as we stated at the subsequent CMC on May 28, 2015, was that with that additional information –if there was any- the parties could get on with briefing the merits of this case.

- 15. On June 1, 2015 I therefore wrote counsel for petitioner by e-mail asking if we could go ahead and set a briefing schedule. Counsel responded: "We do plan to engage in other discovery and I am not ready right now to propose any schedule until we determine the extent of discovery." (See Exhibit "D" hereto.)
- 16. Thereafter on Friday June 12, 2015 our office received a Notice of Taking of Deposition of Defendants" scheduled for June 25, 2015. As I was on vacation at that time, I did not see the notice until I returned June 19, 2015.
- 17. Since petitioner had not to my knowledge at any time specified what material, relevant facts were disputed in this matter, it is my understanding of the law that "extra-record evidence" is inappropriate and not allowed. Therefore on June 23, 2015 I informed counsel that unless he could inform me what material facts were in dispute that might be relevant to the determination of this petition, the county officials would not be attending the deposition and the County would be filing a motion to terminate discovery and set a briefing schedule. (See the e-mail exchange attached hereto as Exhibit "D.")
- 18. However, the very next day I received petitioner's notice of motion and motion to compel (albeit without any hearing date noted.) Once again, in my opinion there is nothing in counsel for petitioner's declaration that specifies what evidence, relevant to the single issue in this proceeding, was disputed by the declarations of Supervisor Rice and Arnold that would allow for extra-record evidence to be sought in this proceeding via discovery.

| 1 | Dated: July 7, 2015. | |
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| 2 | Respectfully Submitted, | |
| 3 | PATRICK K. FAULKNER | |
| 4 | COUNTY COUNSEL | |
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| 6 | DA DH | |
| 7 | By: DAVID L. ZALTSMAN, DEPUTY | |
| 8 | Attorneys for Defendant County of M | ırin |
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